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BALANCING A BURNING CROSS:
THE COURT AND VIRGINIA v. BLACK
JASON

I.

A. ABEL*

INTRODUCTION

I have never seen a cross-burning in person. I do not know what it is
like to wake up in the middle of the night to see the blazing cross light up the
night sky, to see the fire so close to my house. I do not know what it is like
to have to gather my family together, call the police and fire department, and
make sure everything is okay. I do not know what it is like to know that
everything is not okay, that the next thing that could be burned is my house.
I do not know what it is like to receive a threat in this manner, that means
either you leave, or the next thing that bums is your house with your children
inside. I do not know what any of this is like. But, what I do know is that
this crime of hate and violence should be regulated - it cannot, nor should
not, go unpunished. Yet, can this be done in light of the First Amendment?
We may have received an answer - if we look hard enough.
Virginia v. Black,' handed down by the Supreme Court on April 7,
2003, finally cleared up the debate over the constitutionality of cross-burning
laws that was launched in the aftermath of R.A. V v. St. Paul.2 Or did it?
Black is an extremely complex decision, one that the New York Times
Editorial Board 3 got wrong in their first attempt to analyze it. 4 With that
taken into consideration, maybe it is correct to say that, atfirst,Black did not
clear up the confusion, but rather, created more confusion for the states and
municipalities seeking to ban cross-buming.
It is also possible that the heavily-fractured Court in Black not only
clarified its holding in R.A. V, but also laid the groundwork for a
* Associate, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C.; J.D., University of
Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Special
thanks to Professor Seth Kreimer for his insight and guidance, and to Sarah Staszak and
The John Marshall Law Review for their time. I would also like to thank Courtney and my
family for their love and support.
1. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
2. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
3. A Decision on Cross Burning, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at A22.
4. See David Tell, Soon to be a Major New York Times Correction: A New York
Times Editorialgets a Supreme Court Decision Exactly Wrong, THE WEEKLY STANDARD,
Apr. 9, 2003, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/
000/000/002/520igsbz.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2005) (stating that the "[N.Y.] Times
editorial - page version of this screw-up is by far the most spectacular" even though an
accurate article regarding the Black opinion appeared in the N.Y. Times also that day).
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fundamentally sound doctrine on cross-burning bans. This paper argues
exactly that. For all of its shortcomings, the majority in Black did get it
right, and delivered a thoughtful and fair opinion. Most importantly to Civil
Rights activists' is the fact that, unlike in R.A. V, the Court recognized the
long and terror-filled history of cross-burning, and accorded it a special place
in our history.
In Part I, this article explores the similarities of the early-1990
decisions of Texas v. Johnson6 and R.A. V, as well as their inherent
differences that should have led the Supreme Court to reject a blanket
treatment of flag burning and cross burning. An important note at the outset
is that there were some, myself included, that may have agreed with the basic
holding of R.A. V., yet strongly disagreed with Justice Antonin Scalia's dicta
in rendering the Court's decision.
Next, Part II explains and analyzes the Black decision. Because Black
is still a relatively recent opinion, its holding and multiple opinions have not
yet been fully explored, and this paper seeks to do exactly that. The
concurring and dissenting opinions provide an important look into the split
on the Court with regard to First Amendment jurisprudence. Special note
will be made of Justice Clarence Thomas' dissenting opinion 7 and his
uncharacteristic questioning during oral arguments.
Part III explores the soundness of the Court's opinion and explains the
possible ramifications in light of today's watch-what-you-say society.8 For
example, if cross burning holds a significant place in our society, which is in
part why it is proscribable, does displaying a picture of Osama Bin Laden
also hold such a place? In this Part, I engage in my own original analysis
due to the relatively new situation we all find ourselves in. I conclude Part
IV by summarizing the state of the law, post-Black, and offer final thoughts
and insights into the case.
II.

SYMBOLS OF EXPRESSION

In a pair of decisions, the Supreme Court made a strong statement for
the protection of the most extreme and revolting "symbols." 9 Johnson,10
decided in 1989, addressed laws that prohibited flag burning. R.A. V.,
decided in 1992, seemed to equate flag burning laws with those seeking to
ban cross burning. In both cases, the Court held that all of these laws
violated the First Amendment. In order to understand Black and the current
5. Mari J. Matsuda & Charles R. Lawrence III, Epilogue to

MARI J. MATSUDA ET.

AL'S WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE

133 (1993).
6. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
7. Black, 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. See Press Release, Ari Fleischer, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House,
(Sept. 26, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010926-5.html (stating that the public should curtail certain speech in light of the 9-11
attacks). Disapproval of Mr. Fleischer's statements could be the subject of another article.
9. I use quotes around 'symbols' to signify that those who agreed with the Court's
decision looked at the objects in question as symbols.
10. 491 U.S. at400.
FIRST AMENDMENT
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doctrine expounded by the Court, it is important to grasp the basics of
Johnson and the opinion and ramifications of R.A. V.
A.

Texas v. Johnson and Free Expression

In describing the flag burning incident in Johnson, Justice William
Brennan, writing for a five justice majority," stated that "[n]o one was
physically injured or threatened with injury, though several witnesses
testified that they had been seriously offended by the flag-burning." 12 This
statement sums up the complaint of those who would like to see flag burning
prohibitions - they believe that burning a flag is so offensive to their senses
that it should rise to the level of proscribable expression. 13 The Court
rejected this course of action in a methodical fashion. The Court first looked
at whether the State of Texas' regulation was "related to the suppression of
expression."' 4 Using the test expounded upon in Brandenburgv. Ohio,'5 the
Court found that burning a flag was not "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action,"'16 and was also not "likely to incite or to produce
such an action."' 7 In fact, the Court stated that to accept the argument that
flag burning meets this standard would
be to "eviscerate our holding in
18
Brandenburg. This we decline to do."'
The Court next drew on Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, and held that
flag burning does not fall within the proscribable class of "fighting words,"
such that would be "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and
thereby cause a breach of the peace."' 19 As the Court stated, burning a flag as
a protest against the Federal Government cannot be regarded by a reasonable
onlooker as a personal insult or a challenge to a fight.2 0 Therefore, the Court
rejected Texas' misguided interest in preserving the peace by using
Brandenburgand Chaplinsky.
In rejecting the state's arguments, the Court found that Texas was
regulating flag-burning because of what the conduct itself symbolized. The
Court stated that "Johnson's political expression was restricted because of
the content of the message he conveyed. We must therefore subject the
State's asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic character of the

11. The majority consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia, and
Kennedy (who also signed a concurring opinion). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and O'Connor dissented, as did Stevens, who filed a separate dissenting opinion.
12. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399.
13. Compare to Am. Civil Liberties Union, Talking Points on Opposing the Flag
Desecration Amendment, (Mar. 4, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/news/
NewsPrint.cfn?ID=12177&c=50 (last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
14. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
15. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
16. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (quoting Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
574 (1942)).
20. Id.
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flag to the 'most exacting scrutiny."-'21 The Court subjected the Texas law to
strict scrutiny, and held that, while there may be a state interest in protecting
the flag, it does not rise to the level of criminal punishment. 22 Put simply,

the majority of the Court believed that Texas was singling out a political
belief and punishing people's expression of that belief:
The way to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those who feel
differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong....
We can imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving
one's own, no better way to counter a flag burner's message than by saluting a
flag that bums, no surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag that
burned23than by-as one witness here did-according its remains a respectful
burial.

In essence, the Court expounded upon the maxim of fighting speech
with more speech, rather than curtailing the original speech. This is a
fundamentally sound argument against content-based or viewpoint-based
regulation, which would stifle the "marketplace of ideas. 24 It is difficult to
believe that those burning a flag are making anything other than a political
statement. There are those that may find it revolting, but it is hardly
threatening or inciting. There is no connection between burning an
American flag and those flag burners going on to overthrow the
government.
Burning a flag is a political statement, not a threat. This
makes it inherently different from some cross-burnings, yet the Court in
R.A. V declined to agree.
B.

R.A.V. v. St. Paul and the Hate Speech
Doctrine Expounded.. .Sort of

Justice Scalia, who signed onto the majority opinion in Texas v.
Johnson, wrote the majority opinion for the Court in R.A. V.v. St. Paul. At
issue was a St. Paul ordinance that stated:
21. Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
22. Id. at416-18.
23. Id. at 419-20.
24. Steven Shiffrin, The FirstAmendment and the Meaning ofAmerica, in IDENTITIES,

318 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
The flag-burning prohibition is a naked attempt to smother dissent. If we must
have a 'central meaning' of the First Amendment, we should recognize that the
dissenters - those who attack existing customs, habits, traditions and authorities stand at the center of the First Amendment and not at its periphery.
Id. After Johnson, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989. This was a federal
attempt to criminalize flag-burning or any other mutilation of a flag. InUnited States v.
Eichman, the Court struck down the law and stated "the Government's asserted interest in
protecting the "physical integrity" of a privately owned flag ...is related to the
suppression, and concerned with the content, of free expression." 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
25. Some may bring up the fact that burning American flags in foreign countries,
which has been happening more frequently, illustrates that there are those who bum flags
in the U.S. with similar views of utter hatred and disgust towards our system of
government and that they are "un-American." However, as the Court stated in Johnson,
flag burning is a political view of dissent, and should not be regulated solely because its
content is disapproved by many. 491 U.S. at 418.
POLITICS, AND RIGHTS
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Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi Swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
26
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
The ordinance was held to be facially unconstitutional because "it prohibits
speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
otherwise permitted
27
addresses.,,
The Court started its analysis by saying "[c]ontent-based regulations
are presumptively invalid. ' 28 This applies even within those categories of
speech that are constitutionally proscribable. 29 For instance, and directly
relevant here, while fighting words can be regulated under the First
Amendment, specific types of fighting words cannot be banned solely
because of their content or because of the ideas they express.
Even though content-based discrimination is presumptively invalid, the
Court recognized that in situations when the "basis for the content
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech
at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint
discrimination exists., 30 This exception provided the most confusion. Was
the Court saying that if the St. Paul ordinance banning cross burning caused
alarm or resentment based on any category, then it could fall into this
exception? Or, is the Court saying that if the St. Paul ordinance banned the
burning of any symbol that could cause alarm and resentment, then it would
fall under the exception? We learn in Black that the Court meant the former,
However, the R.A. V. opinion created much
rather than the latter.
confusion.31
Further, the R.A. V. opinion generated anger amongst many for its
nonexistent discussion of the harms of cross burning. Justice Scalia placed
this "speech" in the fighting words category, yet provided no direct analysis
as to why this would not be considered a true threat. Granted, this could be
because of the structure of the statute - "arouses anger, alarm or resentment"
- yet it was never explored in depth. Because of that, many scholars
overlooked the actual reasoning for the holding and focused on what seemed

26. St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE
§ 292.02 (1990) (quoted in R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380).
27. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
28. Id. at 382.
29. See examples and cases listed infra notes 71-74.
505 U.S. at 388.
30. R.A. V.,
31. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagementfor Cultural Wars: Regulating
Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29
U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 553 (1996)(stating the many exceptions to the courts holding
"invite[d] confusion as to their scope and application"); Jonathan M. Holdowsky, Out of
the Ashes of the Cross: The Legacy of R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,30 NEW ENG. L. REV.
1115 (1996)(noting that R.A.V. "confused the landscape of first amendment
jurisprudence").
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to be an inefficient discussion of the harms and true threats of cross
burning.32
II.

NOTHING LIKE 'CLARITY' TO CONFUSE THE MATTER:
VIRGINIA v. BLACK EXPLAINED

A.

Proceduraland FactualHistory

As stated in the Introduction, Virginia v. Black at first appeared as if it
would not provide clarity or guidance to the R.A. V. decision. Major news
organizations did not even understand the holding, 33 and the differing
opinions, combined with the bifurcated structure of the statute, further
created confusion. The Virginia statute at issue stated:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating
any person or group of persons, to bum, or cause to be burned, a cross on the
property of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall
violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Any such burning of a cross shall be3frima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons.

For purposes of deciding the case, and because they inherently presented
different constitutional issues, the Court divided up the statute into two
different parts. First is the "intent of intimidating" clause of the statute, and
second is the "prima facie evidence" clause.
Next, the facts of the case should be considered (keeping in mind that
this is actually a consolidation of three separate challenges to the Virginia
statute) because each case implicates a different constitutional question
created by the statute. Barry Black, Richard Elliot, and Jonathan O'Mara
were all convicted under the Virginia statute, yet under different
circumstances. Black was the leader of a Ku Klux Klan rally in which
twenty-five to thirty people attended. The rally occurred on private property
with the permission of the owner, and consisted of Klan members expressing
their beliefs and discussing "what they [Klan members] were., 35 The end of
the rally consisted of the Klan members gathering around a twenty-five to
36
thirty foot cross that was lit ablaze and could be seen up to 350 yards away.
A sheriff, who was knowledgeable about the cross burning statute, observed
the rally. He approached the Klan members and asked them to identify their
leader.37 When Black responded that he was the leader, the sheriff stated that

32. Judith Butler, Burning Acts: InjuriousSpeech, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 199
(1996); Michele M. SinmsParris, Comment, What Does it Mean to See a Black Church
Burning? Understanding the Significance of ConstitutionalizingHate Speech, 1 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 127 (1998).
33. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996) (quoted in Black, 538 U.S. at 348).
35. Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
36. Id. at 349.
37. Id.
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"[t]here's a law in the State of Virginia that you cannot bum a cross and I'll
38
have to place you under arrest for this.
Black was then charged with "burning a cross with the intent of
39
At
intimidating a person or group of persons, in violation of § 18.2-423."
that
note,
to
important
extremely
is
which
instructed,
was
his trial, the jury
"the burning of a cross by itself is sufficient evidence from which you may
°
infer the required intent." This statement was an interpretation of the prima
facie clause of the statute, and was "taken straight out of the [Virginia]
Model Instructions." ' The jury found Black guilty and the Court of Appeals
affirmed his conviction.
42
Elliot and O'Mara, who were not members of the Klan, burned a
cross in the front yard of the Jubilee family. The Jubilees were an AfricanAmerican family who lived next door to Elliot. They claimed that Elliot had
shot a firearm into their yard. Shortly thereafter, during the night of May 2,
Elliot and O'Mara drove a pickup truck onto the Jubilees' property, planted a
43
The Court stated that,
cross in their front yard, and set the cross ablaze.
for complaining about
Jubilee
at
back'
'get
to
was
motive
"[t]heir apparent
were charged with
Elliot
and
O'Mara
Both
backyard.""
the
in
the shooting
O'Mara
cross-burning.
commit
to
conspiracy
and
cross-burning
attempted
plead guilty, yet reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute.45 Elliot, on the other hand, was tried and convicted for the attempted
cross-burning. At his trial, the court told the jury that Virginia had to prove
"the defendant intended to commit cross burning," that "the defendant did a
direct act toward the commission of the cross burning," and that "the
defendant had the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons.6
The court did not instruct the jury on the prima facie evidence provision or
47
The Court of Appeals affirmed
on the definition of the word "intimidate.
both O'Mara and Elliot's convictions.
The Virginia Supreme Court consolidated the three cases and held that
48
As noted in the court's
the statute was unconstitutional on its face.
majority opinion, the majority in the Virginia Supreme Court believed that
the Virginia statute was "analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance
found unconstitutional in R.A.V.," and still amounted to content-based
discrimination because it sought to proscribe the specific message that

38. Id.
39. Id.

40. Id.
41. Id. at349-50
42. This is important because some opponents of cross-burning prohibitions believe
that the statute solely targets the Klan. This is proof that other individuals - those not in
the Klan - bum crosses with the intent to intimidate, and - as I will go on to explain - do
not necessarily burn crosses because of the target's race.
43. Black, 538 U.S. at 350.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 350.
46. Id. at 351.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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burning a cross conveys. 49 As a final note, the Virginia Supreme Court held
that the prima facie provision was overbroad, thereby creating a possibility
that speech could be chilled.50
B.

The United States Supreme Court Opinions

With that procedural background laid out, it is now possible to begin to
analyze the different opinions that the Justices presented. The majority of
the Supreme Court found that the "intent to intimidate" provision in the
Virginia statute was constitutional. The majority consisted of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, who penned the opinion, Stevens, Scalia,
and Breyer; an interesting mix of Justices, to say the least. Justice Thomas,
in a separate opinion, also found this provision to be constitutional, but for
different reasons. The three Justices that believed this provision was
constitutionally unacceptable were Souter, Ginsburg, and Kennedy. They
believed that, in all cases, bans on cross burning are content-based
discrimination.
However, the fact that a majority of Justices found that the "intent to
intimidate" provision was constitutional, did not render a belief that the
statute as a whole was constitutional. In fact, the majority of the Court held
the Virginia statute to be unconstitutional and remanded it back to the
Virginia Supreme Court because of the constitutional problems with the
prima facie provision of the statute. Only Justices Scalia and Thomas
believed that this provision was constitutional. In the opinion of Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Kennedy, the whole statute (both provisions) was
unconstitutional. The plurality opinion written by O'Connor (which became
a plurality opinion in regards to the prima facie provision because Scalia did
not sign on to these parts of the opinion, and rather, wrote separately) found
constitutional problems with this provision and thereby held the entire statute
unconstitutional and remanded back to Virginia for further proceedings. 1
In sum, the statute was held unconstitutional because of the prima facie
provision, yet bans on cross-burning (such as the one seen by the "intent to
intimidate" provision) do not pose constitutional questions of content-based
discrimination. This was how the Court reconciled the Black opinion with
R.A. V In R.A. V, the statute banned cross-burning when used to create
"anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed,
religion or gender, ' 52 whereas the Virginia statute did not provide categories
on the basis of resentment. 3 An illustration may provide a clear example: If
a cross is burned in Virginia with the intent to intimidate someone because
he is a Democrat, that would violate the law. However, under the St. Paul
ordinance, this would not be a crime because political affiliation was not one
of the grounds stated. This is why the Court held that content-based
discrimination existed in R.A. V., yet did not hold the same in Black.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The discussion of the Black case on remand is included in the following sections.
52. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (quoted in R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (quoted in Black, 538 U.S. at 348).
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O'Connor'sOpinion

Justice O'Connor's opinion is the controlling authority in Virginia v.
Black. It is divided into five parts and can be generally classified as follows:
I) Procedural history; II) History of cross-burning and its impact on the
African-American community; IlI.A) General doctrines of proscribable
speech; III.B) Consideration of R.A. V. as applied to the "intent to intimidate"
provision; IV) Overbreadth analysis of the prima facie provision; and
V) Result and disposition. Parts I-III represent a majority of the Court, while
Parts IV and V represent a plurality of four Justices.
Unlike in R.A. V., the Court in Black considered the history of cross55
burning in America and its special psychological impact upon society. The
Court explored the origins of cross-burning and its rise as a tool of the
Klan.56 Also, the Court discussed the intertwined history of the Klan, and
specifically discussed the rise of the second Klan in 1915 after popular
culture films like "A Birth of a Nation", which glorified the Klan, gained
notoriety.57 In assessing the point of cross burning, the Court stated: "From
the inception of the second Klan, cross burnings have been used to
58
communicate both threats of violence and messages of shared ideology.',
This distinction is important, for the Court refers back to this history in order
to support its beliefs that only cross-burnings with the "intent to intimidate"
could be banned.
For the first possible message of cross-burning - the threat of violence
- the Court invoked the idea that the burning of a cross was used and widely
59
known "as a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending violence," and
that cross-bumings "embodied threats to people whom the Klan deemed
antithetical to its goals, ' 60 regardless of race, religion, or ethnicity. The
Court also made a statement that many wished it would have made in R.A. V:
"[T]he history of violence associated with the Klan shows that the possibility
61
From the
of injury or death [after a cross-burning] is not just hypothetical.,
is a
cross
a
burning
cases,
history cited, the Court concluded that in some
the
effect
threat of imminent danger - with no other message. Furthermore,
of a cross-burning reverberates through the community, and when a cross is
burned on a front lawn, the message is extremely clear: get out or the next
object that bums is your house.
The Court then embarked on a discussion of the other possible
messages for a cross-burning - shared ideas among a group of like-minded
54. I do not include a separate section for Justice Stevens concurring opinion because

of its brevity.

However, Stevens signs on to O'Connor's opinion, which is explained

above.
55. Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57. It is a matter of time to see whether the concerns
expressed supra notes 33-34 will be satisfied by the narrative of the Court in Part II of its
opinion.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 352-55.
Id. at 353-54.
Id. at 354.
Id.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 357.
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individuals. 62 Recognizing that the burning cross became a symbol of the
Klan, the Court explained how a burning cross can be the climatic
conclusion of a rally in which political, social, and cultural views were
expressed.63 Furthermore, and much to Justice Thomas' disapproval, 64 the
Court noted that the burning cross can be used as a sign of protest and even a
political statement.65
Summing up the historical findings, the Court stated:
To this day, regardless of whether the message is a political one or whether the
message is also meant to intimidate, the burning of a cross is a "symbol of
hate."... And while cross burning sometimes carries no intimidating message,
at other times the intimidating message is the only message conveyed. 66
Therefore, the majority opinion set up the dichotomy between burning a
cross for intimidating purposes, and for any other purpose. This is a
distinction that angered Justice Thomas and allowed the Court to sidestep the
issue of suppressing political speech. Because the Virginia statute only
banned cross-burning done with an intent to intimidate, the Court was able to
walk that fine line in upholding the ban. Yet, as can be seen in the
discussion of the prima facie provision, once cross-burning is banned
because it falls in the second category (hateful message), it becomes nonproscribable speech and, therefore, may be an unconstitutional ban. This
will become clearer as the specific parts of the opinion, and therefore, the
provisions, are addressed.
In Part III of the Black opinion, the majority makes its impact on First
Amendment doctrine and clarifies aspects of R.A. V that had confounded
scholars for eleven years. The majority began its discussion of prior First
Amendment decisions by quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes from his
dissent in Abrams v. United States, reaffirming the idea that free speech is to
allow "'free trade of ideas'-even ideas that the overwhelming majority of
people might find distasteful or discomforting. 67 In what could be looked at
as its preemptive strike against being considered discriminatory toward an
unpopular position, the Court then turned to the Johnson opinion. 68 This was
important to establish that the Court was not allowing content-based
discrimination in this case.
After the introduction, the Court recognized that the First Amendment
is not an absolute blanket protection for all speech and expression, and
outlined the four major categories that present proscribable speech situations:

62. Id. at 356.
63. Id. (stating how two individuals were married under a blazing cross).
64. Id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 357.
66. Id. (quoting Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 771
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
67. Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919)).
68. Id. (quotingJohnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (1989)).
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70

3) incitement to
1) words that inflict injury; 69 2) fighting words;
72
7
majority, crossthe
to
According
threats.,
"true
4)
'
and
lawlessness;
The Court
category.
fourth
the
into
falls
intimidate
to
intent
the
with
burning
the
where
statements
"those
encompassing
as
threat
true
a
then defined
commit
to
intent
an
of
expression
serious
a
communicate
to
speaker means
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
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victims that they are a target of violence.
The fact that the Court placed cross burning with the intent to
intimidate under the "true threat" category is very note worthy. In essence,
the Court is speaking louder with its actions than with the simple words in
Part II. For it would be one thing to talk about the history of violence
associated with cross-burning and then apply the fighting words analysis, as
was done in R.A. V., yet another thing to recognize cross-burning as a threat.
76
The
Unlike R.A. V, the Black Court applied the "true threat" analysis.
Court followed the position of many scholars, activists, and victims: that
cross-burning can be nothing more than a threat. It is not a provocation, but
rather a statement that violence will follow.
The Court then addressed whether or not the Virginia Supreme Court
was correct in holding that the statute amounted to content and/or viewpoint
discrimination. In rejecting that position, the Court distinguished the
ordinance in R.A. V. from the Virginia statute. The St. Paul ordinance only
targeted content that would "arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others on
77
Because there were
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.,
specific subjects listed, it thereby affected certain viewpoints of the cross
burner. For instance, the ordinance covered those that expressed racist or
anti-Semitic views, but did not cover "[t]hose who wish to use 'fighting
words' in connection with other ideas - to express hostility, for example, on

69. Black, 538 U.S. at 359; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942) (stating that words, "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace," are proscribable).
70. Black, 538 U.S. at 359; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)
(noting that words are proscribable "when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a
matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction").
71. Black, 358 U.S. at 359; see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (per curium)
(stating that words are proscribable "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
72. Black, 358 U.S. at 359 (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)
(per curium)).
73. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
74. Id. at 360.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 359.
77.

ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02.
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the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality. 78
Meanwhile, as noted above, the Virginia statute made no such distinctions
that would weigh one viewpoint over another. However, the next question
that was raised was with regard to the regulation of the burning of a cross
itself. Is banning cross-burning, while not banning any other type of
symbolic burning, content-based discrimination?
In short, the Court said no, it is not. Turning back to R.A. V, the Court
found exceptions to the content-based-discrimination-is-unconstitutional
rule. Utilizing the "particularly virulent" exception, the Court held that
banning cross-burning is not unconstitutional content-based discrimination.79
In essence, this is a way of getting around content or viewpoint based
discrimination by recognizing the severity of the harm created by the speech
or expression. The Court provided two examples that may clear this up.
First, threats against the President are criminalized. In and of itself, a threat
against the President is so severe that it falls under one of the proscribable
categories.80 However, if the law were to criminalize only threats made
against the President that resulted from a specific position or action that the
President has taken, then that would be content-based discrimination. 8 1
Similarly, offensive obscenity as a whole can be banned, but obscenity only
dealing with political undertones cannot be banned. 2
In regards to cross-burning, it is okay to ban cross-burning with the
intent to intimidate, as a whole and for all reasons;8 3 however, it is
unconstitutionaland content-based discrimination to ban those categories of
cross-burning that are committed because of racist and prejudiced motives
only.84 According to the Court, it should not matter why the intimidation
occurs, and to weigh one reason over another would be to engage in content
or viewpoint-based discrimination. Cross-burning, as seen in history, creates
a true threat, and thus, may be regulated and criminalized. As opposed to
burning a circle or star, a burning cross signifies violence, and is
"particularly virulent" in and of itself. That is why, according to the Court,
it

78. R.A.V.,505U.S. at391.

79. Id. at 388.

When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason
the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or
viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been adjudged neutral
enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment
protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class.

Id.
80. Id. at 388.
81. For example, it would be content-based discrimination if the only threats that were
banned were those based on the President's position against affirmative action. This
would be discrimination against those who are in favor of affirmative action, while those
who made the same threat, but were of a different viewpoint, would not be punished.
82. Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
83. VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-423.
84. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02.
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is not necessary to include the burning of other shapes - they do not signify
violence.85
It is important to recognize that burning a cross is a threat of violence,
and does not necessarily apply only to white supremacist perpetrators and
African-American victims. In fact, as stated above, and included in the
Court's reasoning, "it is not true that cross burners direct their intimidating
86
Because of this, the Court
conduct solely to racial or religious minorities.
held that:
The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the
intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of
intimidation. Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may
choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of87cross
violence.
burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of impending
However, when it comes to other types of cross-burning (i.e. at a political
rally), in which there may be no intent to intimidate, that conduct is protected
by the First Amendment. Ultimately, what is defined as an intent to
intimidate is a question for the jury, and that question implicates the prima
facie provision, which Justice O'Connor discusses in Part IV of the opinion.
In Part IV, Justice Scalia did not join Justice O'Connor's opinion,
thereby making it a plurality opinion rather than a majority opinion.
However, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Kennedy agreed with O'Connor's
disposition, so the result and judgment is controlling. The Court ultimately
ruled that the Virginia statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because of the
prima facie provision. 8 8 The prima facie provision suggested that the act of
89
burning a cross, in and of itself, is evidence of an intent to intimidate.
Immediately, one should recognize that this philosophy cuts at the heart of
the distinction Justice O'Connor laid out in Part II - separating crossburnings done with political intent from those done with threatening intent.
It should also be immediately recognized that the prima facie provision has
the ability to remove all cross-burning under the statute from the
proscribable category of true threats: if cross burning that is not a threat can
be covered by the statute, then it will be considered to be constitutionally
overbroad.
In its analysis, the plurality looks at the facts of each of the three cases
to see which of the defendants were implicated by the prima facie provision.
While O'Mara plead guilty, Elliot's jury did not receive a jury instruction on
the prima facie provision, therefore, it did not work to his disadvantage at
trial. 90 Black's jury, on the other hand, did receive an instruction that stated,
"The burning of a cross, by itself, is sufficient evidence from which you may

85. See Black, 538 U.S. at 391 (explaining that an individual would probably call the
fire department, rather than the local police, if a circle was burning in his front lawn).

86. Id.
87. Id. at 363.
88. Id. at 366-67.
89. Id. at 364 (citing Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 746 (Va. 2001).
90. Id. at351,364.
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infer the required intent.' 91 According to the Court, the prima facie
provision "renders the statute unconstitutional" because it allows for jury
instructions that remove the required intent needed from the first part of the
statute.92 What results from the prima facie provision is a statute resembling
strict liability, in which someone can be convicted based on an
incontrovertible fact. In other words, a prosecutor need not prove intent to
intimidate because the actual act of burning a cross is, by itself, sufficient
enough evidence of intent to intimidate. The Court correctly held that this
circular reasoning strips the statute of its constitutionality because it
regulates a much wider category of speech than just "true threats. 93
The effect of the prima facie provision, according to the Court, would
be to chill speech that could be considered "core political speech., 94 The
Court referred back to the history it laid out in Part II of the opinion, where it
distinguished between the types of cross burning and stated that "[t]he prima
facie provision makes no effort to distinguish among these different types of
cross burnings." 95 Furthermore, in recognizing that a "sense of anger or
hatred is not sufficient to ban all cross burnings," 96 the Court recognized that
the prima facie provision can "skew jury deliberations toward conviction in
cases where the evidence of intent to intimidate is relatively weak. 97 This
"shortcut" 98 is not allowed by the First Amendment and cannot
withstand
judicial scrutiny. Because the Virginia Supreme Court never authoritatively
interpreted the meaning of the statute, the Court remanded the statute back to
that court so that it could either interpret it in a constitutionally sound
manner consistent with the opinion, or sever the provision from the
99
otherwise-constitutional statute.
Part V then affirmed the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court with
regard to the defendant, Black, and allowed his conviction to be thrown out
because it was effectively tainted by the jury instructions based on the
unconstitutional prima facie provision. 10 0
For Elliot and O'Mara, their
judgments were vacated and remanded back to the Supreme Court of
Virginia, since technically they were convicted under an unconstitutional
statute (even though the prima facie provision did not directly affect
them).'0 '
2.

Scalia's Opinion

Justice Scalia agreed with Parts I-III of the Court's opinion and agreed
that cross-burning with the intent to intimidate can be regulated without
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. (quoting VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIM., No. 10.250 (2001)).
Id. at 364-65.
Id.
Id. at 365-66.
Id. at 366.
Id.
Id. at 366 (quoting id. at 385)(Souter, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 367.
Id. at 367-68.
Id.
Id.
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infringing upon the First Amendment. 0 2 He also believed that the decision
of the Virginia Supreme Court should be vacated and the statute remanded so
that the court could construe, in an authoritative fashion, the meaning of the
prima facie provision.' 0 3 However, Justice Scalia departed from the opinion4
of the Court when it invalidated the prima facie provision on its face.'
Whereas the opinion of the Court held that the prima facie provision
amounted to an irrubuttable presumption, Justice Scalia argued that the
prima facie provision is a rebuttablepresumption, and should not have been
automatically interpreted otherwise by the Court. 10 5 He raised the specter of
possibility that a prima facie provision could comply with constitutional
standards, contrary to the Court's view that the prima facie provision, on its
face, is invalid.
Looking into canonical understandings of primafacie evidence, Justice
Scalia concluded that it could be rebutted, and because the majority assumed
otherwise, they made an interpretative mistake. He turned to Black's Law
Dictionary, 10

6

Virgi.Iia case law,'0 7 and hornbooks 10 8 to support this decision.

Justice Scalia would allow the Virginia Supreme Court to interpret this
provision as it stands, with the possibility that it is in fact constitutional, and
does not raise the questions that the Court's opinion suggests.
With that said, Justice Scalia then engaged in a test of the provision's
He sharply attacked the Virginia Supreme Court's
constitutionality.
overbreadth analysis and stated that the Court has "never held that the mere
threat that individuals who engage in protected conduct will be subject to
arrest and prosecution suffices to render a statute overbroad."' 0 9 Instead, it is
the threat of a conviction that could make the statute overbroad, and he
argued that the majority did engage in this proper analysis, but just came to
the wrong conclusion." 0 The Court believed that the prima facie provision
would lead to the conviction of individuals that had not met the intent to
intimidate standard; Scalia simply believed it would not."' Furthermore,
while the plurality stated that this justified invalidation pending an
interpretation, Justice Scalia wanted to take the prima facie provision's
effects on a case-by-case basis, meaning the Court of Appeals would review
the associated jury instruction if it were challenged.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 368.
Black, 538 U.S. at 368 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Id.
Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 369 ("if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient") (quoting

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (6th ed. 1990)).

107. Id. ("cuts off no defense") (quoting Nance v. Commonwealth, 124 S.E.2d 900, 903
(Va. 1962)); id. ("unless rebutted") (quoting Babbitt v. Miller, 64 S.E.2d 718, 722 (Va.
1951)).
108. Id. at 370 ("if not rebutted") (quoting 7B MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE OF VIRGINIA
AND WEST VIRGINIA § 32 (1998)).

109. Id. at 371.
110. Id. at 371-72.
111. Id. at372.
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Justice Scalia then proceeded to state that the prima facie provision
would not reach a "substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct,"'1 12 and "includes only those individuals who (1) burn a cross in
public view, (2) do not intend to intimidate, (3) are nonetheless charged and
prosecuted, and (4) refuse to present a defense." ' 1 3 He concluded that the
number of individuals that fall into this category would be extremely limited
and, therefore, the provision was not unconstitutionally overbroad.1 4 Justice
Scalia further found it unprecedented that the Court invalidated the statute
based on
what he believed to be an ambiguous jury instruction and nothing
115
more.

In sum, Justice Scalia would not have invalidated the provision on its
face, but rather, would have remanded it to the Virginia Supreme Court for
interpretation (which he seems to conclude will be sound regardless of its
interpretation). He concurred with the Court's decision to vacate and remand
with respect to Elliot and O'Mara, yet would
have allowed Virginia to retry
6
Black, rather than strike his conviction."
3.

Souter's Opinion

Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Kennedy, found both
provisions of the statute unconstitutional and went one step further. It was
their opinion that all cross-burning statutes amount to content-based
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. Justice Souter believed
that "the specific prohibition of cross burning with intent to intimidate
selects a symbol with particular content from the field of all proscribable
expression meant to intimidate." ' 1 7 He associated white supremacy with
cross-burning and believed that the selection of a burning cross, and only a
burning cross, is shunning that particular viewpoint. While the majority uses
a "particularly virulent" exception to content-based discrimination, Justice
Souter did not find that this statute fit into that exception, as first expounded
upon in R.A. V He believed that the majority loosened the doctrine set out in
8
R.A.V to the point of including constitutionally protected conduct."
The opinion then rebutted the examples of conduct that the majority
used to support the "particularly virulent" exception: presidential threats and
obscenity. According to Justice Souter's opinion, cross-burning is not
comparable to these cases because cross-burning is a statement of white
supremacy and a regulation that picks a subclass of conduct that the
majority thought it was avoiding. 19 Surprisingly, the opinion of Justice
Souter seemed to disregard the specific and historically threatening nature of

112. Id. at 373 (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 494 (1982)).
113. Id. at374.
114. Id. at 374-75.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 376.
Id. at 379-80.
Id. at 381 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 382-83.
Id. at383.
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cross-burning by saying "threats of violence are not an integral feature of any
one subject or viewpoint as distinct from others."' 2 °
In an interesting analytical move, Justice Souter stated that due to the
tainting of the cases by the prima facie provision, it is impossible to find out
whether there was a high probability that "official suppression of ideas is
afoot.' 12 ' As cited by the plurality, the prima facie provision would "skew"
juries towards conviction 122 and draw non-threatening ideological expression
into suppression. 23 The proper mode of analysis, according to the Souter
opinion is as follows: rather than looking at the overbreadth of the prima
facie provision, the Court should look at whether suppression of ideas is
afoot. After finding that ideas were suppressed, Justice Souter argued that
the statute failed strict scrutiny. 24 He, along with Justices Kennedy and
Ginsberg, found that all cross-burning statutes were unconstitutional contentbased discrimination and, more specifically, would have affirmed the
Court and ordered the dismissal of all three respondents'
Virginia Supreme
25
indictments. 1

4.

Thomas' Opinion

Justice Thomas' opinion in this case seemed to be one of the most
This is due to his
eagerly anticipated opinions in recent memory.
2 6
uncharacteristic questioning - even advocating - during oral arguments.'
While technically a dissent, Justice Thomas upheld the constitutionality of
the statute as a whole. 127 In a remarkable move, Justice Thomas did not find
the statute to be constitutional on First Amendment grounds, but rather found
that cross-burning 8 was conduct and referred to its shameful place in
American history.12

Moving through his opinion, he first cited Rehnquist's dissent in Texas
Johnson'29 to make the argument that cross-burning holds a unique place
in history.' 30 He called the Klan a "terrorist organization,"' 13' and stated that
cross-burning is "a tool for the intimidation and harassment of racial
minorities, Catholics, Jews, Communists, and any other groups hated by the
Klan.', 132 In a lengthy and well documented footnote, Justice Thomas
133
expounded upon the evident link between cross burning and violence.
v.

120. Id.at 384.
121. Id. at 384 (quoting R.A. V., 503 U.S. at 390).
122. Id. at 385.
123. Id. at 386.
124. Id. at 387.
125. Id.
126. Charles Lane, High Court Hears Thomas on KKK Rite, WASH. POST, Dec. 12,
2002, at A01.

127. Black, 538 U.S. at 400.
128. Id. at 388-94.
129. 491 U.S. 397, 422-29.

130. Black, 538 U.S. at 388.
131. Id. at388-89.
132. Id. at 389 (quoting Capitol Square Review, 515 U.S. at 770).
133. Id. at390n.1.
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Justice Thomas' opinion also explained the fear and intimidation associated
with cross-burning 134 that is not just limited to the reactions of AfricanAmericans, but includes other groups as well.1 35 He stated: "In our culture,
cross burning has almost inrariably meant lawlessness and understandably
instills in its victims a well-grounded fear of physical violence.' 36 Justice
Thomas then moved from the
place of cross-burning in American history to
137
its place in Virginia history.
Justice Thomas described cross-burning as the "Siamese twin" of
violent and terrorist conduct, 138 and thereby should be treated as such. In a
bold statement, he exclaimed that "this statute prohibits only conduct, not
expression.' ' 139 He continued:
[J]ust as one cannot bum down someone's house to make a political point and
then seek refuge in the First Amendment, those who hate cannot terrorize and
intimidate to make their point. In light of my conclusion that the statute here
addresses only conduct, there is no need to analyze it under any of our First
Amendment tests. 140
Even if, however, there was expression to be considered here, Justice
Thomas believed that no constitutional problems were presented, as a jury
could "draw an inference of intent to intimidate from the cross burning
itself."' 14 1 Moving one step further than Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas
defined the prima facie provision as just an "inference"
rather than an
142
irrebuttable presumption that the plurality defines it as.
However, this distinction is academic, for he believed that there should
be a presumption that all cross-burnings are done for intimidating purposes.
In fact, he stated that "not making a connection between cross burning and
intimidation would be irrational."' 143 Herein lies another large distinction
between Justice Thomas and the other members of the Court: Justice Thomas
believed that cross burning, in every instance, is a tool of intimidation and
violence. To him, burning a cross cannot be for core political expression
because of its history in American life and its effects on certain individuals,
in particular, African-Americans. 144 Burning a cross contains no message

134. Id. at390-91.
135. See id. at 391 (stating that the Klan expanded its enemy list to include Jews,
Catholics, and immigrants).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 391-95.

138. Id. at 394.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 394-95.
141. Id. at 395.
142. Id. at 395-96.
143. Id. at 397 (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 399-400.
[T]he plurality strikes down the statute because one day an individual might wish to
bum a cross, but might do so without an intent to intimidate anyone. That cross
burning subjects its targets, and, sometimes, an unintended audience ...to extreme
emotional distress, and is virtually never viewed merely as "unwanted
communication," but rather, as a physical threat, is of no concern to the plurality.
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and is only an act of violence and intimidation. According to Justice
Thomas, if there is a message to be conveyed by burning a cross, it is so
tainted by violence that it is unworthy of protection.
IV.

ANALYSIS: THE DIFFICULTY OF BALANCING A BURNING CROSS

Part of the analysis that needed to be accomplished was actually
figuring out the meaning of Virginia v. Black. This complex opinion, as a
sequel to another complex opinion, 145 presented a challenge for many to
decipher where the Court placed the Virginia Statute in its pattern of
jurisprudence. With that said, the Court made the right decision and
correctly balanced the threatening nature of cross burning with protected
First Amendment rights to political expression. R.A. V. was significantly
lacking in its understanding, discussion, and consideration of cross burning.
While that decision may have complied with First Amendment
jurisprudence, what was not said spoke greater volumes than the
constitutional analysis. Black fills in the void left by Justice Scalia's opinion
in R.A. V, yet does not go so far as to abridge political expression.
The Court provided a much needed history of cross burning in the
country, and more specifically, for Virginia. In order to understand the
meaning of cross-burning, its practical effects, and its philosophical
implications, the Court needed Part II. This history fully divulges what
many scholars, activists, and academics have argued for eleven years: crossburning is inherently different and unique in American society and
throughout American history. Its significance goes far beyond a symbol of
expression. It has been used as a threat, and as a warning, and like other hate
crimes, has very real effects on the sociological structure of the
community. 146 When an African-American family, for example, has a cross
burned on their lawn, it is a message to get out; it is a warning that violence
will follow. And47violence does follow, as the Court very deservingly noted
and considered. 1
R.A. V almost completely ignored this phenomenon and seemed to
equate the burning of a cross to a provocation to fight, rather than a threat of
imminent violence. Cross burning does not, as the R.A. V Court indirectly
implies, provoke a fighting mentality in its victims. Rather, it provokes fear,
Henceforth, under the plurality's view, physical safety will be valued less than the

right to be free from unwanted communications.

Id. (citation omitted).
145. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377.
146.

See generally FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER

AMERICAN LAW (1999); Lesley C. Barlow, Schoolyard Cross-Burning:Free Speech or
Felony?, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 499 (1999); John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context:
The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 653 (1994); Leonard S. Rubinowitz &

Imani Perry, Crimes without Punishment: White Neighbors' Resistance to Black Entry, 92
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335 (2001) (reviewing STEPHEN G. MEYER, AS LONG AS
THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DOOR; SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOODS (2000)).

147. See Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57 (discussing the relationship between cross-burning
and violence).
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intimidation, and shock. 148 Because cross-burning with an intent to
intimidate is a threat, and is solely intended to be a threat, it should be
constitutionally proscribable speech under the true threat analysis. Does
burning a cross send a message? Yes. But that message, like other threats,
does not always receive constitutional protection.
Furthermore, the
significance of a burning cross and its designation that there will be violence,
is proof that it is a threat. This is a threat that has credibility, unlike other
threats that are constitutional to ban. In other words, if threats of less
credibility and severity are banned under the "true threat" analysis, surely
cross-burning can be as well.
The Court also correctly decided that content-based discrimination does
not occur here. Unlike the categories listed in the St. Paul ordinance, the
Virginia statute makes no such value judgment. Furthermore, the selection
of a burning cross, rather than all burning objects, is not content-based
discrimination. Justice Souter over-characterized the political message of
white supremacy in the burning of a cross. The cross is burned as a threat,
and the reality is that no other symbols are burned that accomplish the goal
of threatening its recipients. It would be silly to say that you must ban the
burning of a sphere in order to ban the burning of a cross. A burning sphere
(other than that it is unheard of) does not amount to a threat. Because of its
usage in history, burning crosses amounts to a threat, and furthermore, is a
situation where the action and speech is "particularly virulent" and therefore,
fits into the exception to content-based discrimination.
However, Justice Thomas is extreme in his analysis of a burning cross.
Based on his background and history, I believe that his constitutional
analysis is flawed. To say that burning a cross is solely conduct and contains
no message is a very scary proposition. Yes, burning a cross is an act, but
then again, so is speaking. So is burning a flag. Everything we do can be
considered conduct, but with some conduct there are messages that
accompany it. Justice Thomas falls into the trap of wanting to ban speech
that he finds reprehensible and without redeeming value. Yes, burning a
cross has no redeeming value, but in some cases it is a political statement,
and in others it is speech - while it is a threat, it is still speech. That is
deserving of First Amendment analysis.
There are those that may use that exact argument to criticize the
majority's and my analysis that would allow for the banning of a burning
cross with the intent to intimidate. However, the lynchpins of the Black
decision and of the statute that hold it up amongst First Amendment
jurisprudence are the distinctions that are drawn. In the statute, there is a
distinction drawn between cross burning and cross burning with the intent to
intimidate. This was expounded upon by the Court and documented fully in
the historical analysis. A burning cross can in fact have a message deserving
of protection. Granted, it may not be deserving of respect, let alone value,
but it is deserving of protection. The Klan has the ability to march through
Skokie, Illinois. A neo-Nazi has the right to wear a swastika on an arm band.

148. Id.

2005]

Balancing a Burning Cross: Virginia v. Black

1225

An individual can wear a shirt with a picture of Osama Bin Laden on it. Are
all of these statements deserving of value? Of course not - they are hatefilled and are revolting. However, our society is one that is founded upon
dissent and the marketplace of ideas. If we do not protect those messages
which we hate, then we open the door for those that hate us, to one day ban
our messages.
A hate-filled message does not rise to the level of a threat solely
because it is hateful. There must be more that accompanies the hate; a true
and real threat to an individual or group of individuals. This is why a
burning cross can be banned, but a swastika cannot. The sociological and
historical meanings of a burning cross symbolize a threat when done in a
particular fashion - burnt with intent to intimidate. These threats can and
should be banned - but only those that are threats. This is where the Court
draws an effective line and where Justice Thomas fails in his analysis. As
much as we dislike it, a burning cross, on its face, is not a threat, and because
of the prima facie provision, the Court correctly decided that it opened the
door for implicating hateful, but non-threatening messages.
To accept Justice Thomas' approach would be going too far in
regulating speech. Earlier, this article posed the question of whether a
burning cross can ever have a message other than a threat, and I believe it
can. It is always a symbol of hate, but sometimes, when done amongst those
of similar hateful philosophies, it is a symbol that is correctly protected. I do
raise the specter that a burning cross at a Klan rally may, because of the
history cited, create an incitement of violence. While I agree with the final
result and disposition in Brandenburg v. Ohio, that the statute at issue was
constitutionally faulty, I disagree with the analysis that under a perfectly
sound statute, waving a loaded gun at a Klan rally and exclaiming "[b]ury
the niggers" and "[s]end the Jews back to Israel" 149 is not incitement.
Arguing that something is incitement may open a Pandora's box that would
be impossible to close, and value judgments may work its way to a fatal
point in the analysis. For instance, can it be argued that a picture of Osama
Bin Laden, or an audio tape of his speech can be banned because it will
incite his followers to violence? This is a dark road that, if embarked upon,
would not bode well for dissenting speech.
With that aside, cross-burning can in fact be a symbolic expression of
political opinions, and the prima facie provision of the statute effectively
strips the specificity required by the First Amendment. It is a Catch-22. You
cannot burn a cross with the intent to intimidate; however, if you burn a
cross, that by itself is an intent to intimidate, and thus, is criminal. Even
though Justices Scalia and Thomas get into the specifics of what primafacie
means, I believe the plurality, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and
Kennedy, is correct in invalidating that provision on its face. There is no
need for that provision and it ruins the statute's distinction between
unprotected cross-burning and protected cross-burning. The proper course of
action on remand was for the Virginia Supreme Court to sever the provision

149. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 446 n.l.
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and, in the severance order, guide lower court judges as to the meaning of
intimidation.1 50 Justice Scalia's assertion that this should be handled on a
case-by-case basis is an amazingly inefficient and unrealistic proposal.
I feel no sympathy for Klan members, yet to criminalize protected
speech, and to penalize anyone who engages in what is uniformly considered
by the Court as protected speech is unsound practice and procedure. By
facially invalidating the provision, the Court avoided this problem and is
implicitly suggesting to the Virginia Supreme Court to find a way to sever
the provision and save the statute.
V.

CONCLUSION

Virginia v. Black was a victory for both civil rights and civil liberties.
The Court drew an effective and an efficient line between threats deserving
of no protection, and hateful expression deserving of protection. Of course,
there will be civil liberties advocates that side with the approach of Justices
Souter, Ginsberg and Kennedy. They may say that the Court went too far in
its holding that cross burning can be constitutionally banned if done with the
intent to intimidate. There will also be civil rights activists who believe that a
burning a cross is always threatening and thereby deserving of no protection.
The situation, however, is not as clear as either side would like it to be. It
was imperative for the Court to recognize the unique harms of burning a
cross in American society and in history - that it sometimes can be nothing
more and nothing less than a threat of imminent, severe violence. This
discussion was lacking in R.A. V, and is part of the larger "color-blind"
debate among the Supreme Court justices and in American society. Certain
ills must be recognized and classified for what they are. For any individual
of any skin color, any religion, anything - a burning cross in one's front lawn
is a threat - not an invitation for dialogue, and therefore, must be treated as a
threat. However, we cannot go so far as to ban cross-burning in all
situations, especially when it is not done with the intent to intimidate a
victim (this therefore reflects my belief that a cross can be burned without
intent to intimidate a victim). To do so would then open the door to banning
all hateful symbols.
With the Black opinion, the Court rightfully struck down a statute
because of a provision that went too far. But in doing so, it justly
recognized, and inherently held, that a state could ban cross-burning. Those
statutes send a message to those filled with hate that violence and threats of
violence will not be tolerated in society anymore. Yes, even hate-mongers
have the right to express their views, but no one has the right to threaten
another with violence and harm.

150. On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Elliot v. Commonwealth, severed the
prima facie provision, thus affirming defendants' conviction. 593 S.E. 2d 263 (Va. 2004).

